Abstract-Parameterized model checking refers to any method that extends traditional, finite-state model checking to handle systems with an arbitrary number of processes. One popular approach to this problem uses abstraction and so-called guard strengthening. Here a small number of processes remain intact, while the rest are abstracted away. This initially causes counter-examples, but the user can write non-interference lemmas, which eliminate spurious behavior by the abstracted processes. The technique is sound in that if the user writes a lemma that is not invariant, the proof will never succeed. Though the non-interference lemmas are typically much simpler than writing a full inductive invariant, there is still a non-trivial amount of human insight needed to analysis counter-examples and concoct the lemmas. In our work, we show how the process of inferring appropriate non-interference lemmas can be automated. Our approach is based on a very general theory that simply assumes a Galois connection between the concrete and abstract systems. Effectively, we start with the non-interference conjecture False, and iteratively weaken it until it is provable using the Galois connection. This produces the strongest non-interference lemma provable in the Galois connection. Hence, if the approach fails to prove the property, then no human lemma would help, since it is the strongest possible lemma. We instantiate this theory to a class of symmetric parameterized systems, and show how BDDs can be used to perform all involved computations. We also show how BDD-blow up that can arise when concretizing can be mitigated by using a sound over-approximation. We successfully applied the resulting tool to three parameterized verification benchmarks: the GERMAN protocol with data path, the GERMAN2004 protocol, and the FLASH protocol. To our knowledge, this is the first time automatic parameterized model checking has been done on GERMAN2004.
INTRODUCTION
Consider the problem of verifying a safety property of a system S with an arbitrary (but fixed) number n processes. One compelling method to solve this problem involves model checking a finite state system A 0 involving a small number m (typically 2 or 3) of unmodified concrete processes, along with an abstracted process [21] , [6] , [15] , [18] , [19] , [27] . The abstracted process overapproximates the behaviors of an arbitrary number of processes. Because of this approximation, the abstracted process usually interferes with the concrete processes in some undesirable way, not possible in the unabstracted system. Hence the invariant property typically fails in A 0 . However, the method allows the human to write a so-called non-interference lemma ψ 1 which is a conjectured invariant of S manually culled from counterexample (cex) analysis. One uses ψ 1 to restrict the abstracted process in A 0 via a technique called guard strengthening, which yields a new system A 1 , which again may or may not satisfy the safety property. If not, the user iterates the process, writing non-interference lemmas ψ 1 , ψ 2 , . . . and producing a succession of abstract systems A 0 , A 1 , A 2 , . . . that are model checked. Assuming a system A k is found to satisfy the property, one must still confirm that i ψ i is an invariant of S. Surprisingly, the theory allows one to decide this by checking that i ψ i is an invariant of A k ; this is counter-intuitive because A k is in a sense constructed under the assumption that i ψ i is an invariant.
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Assuming that this check also passes, we have proved that the system S is safe for arbitrary n.
In this paper we automate this process. We compute the strongest possible non-interference lemma that is provable using the underlying abstraction. We then simply check if this invariant implies the safety property. If this approach fails to prove the property, i.e. the computed invariant does not imply the property, then one must necessarily use a better abstraction, for example by adding more concrete processes or axillary variables. In particular since there is no stronger invariant that can be proved invariant using the approach, no manually selected lemmas would have helped out.
Roughly, our approach involves starting with the strong non-interference conjecture False. We strengthen the concrete system with this conjecture, abstract, and compute the reachable states in the abstract domain. We then concretize the reachable states, which will yield some weaker conjecture. We iterate, using the successively weaker conjectures found by concretizing the reachable abstract states as lemmas for strengthening the concrete system. Hence our approach involves an inner loop that computes forward reachability in abstract systems, and an outer loop that concretizes the reachable abstract states, strengthens the concrete system with the result, and re-abstracts. We terminate when the outer loop reaches a fix-point in the sense that no new reachable abstract states are found.
Two primary contributions of this paper are a general theory that supports this technique, and an instantiation of the theory for a class of symmetric parameterized protocols, similar to that of Krstić's [15] . This class admits Fig. 1 . A process in our example parameterized system a small model theorem not unlike that of Pnueli et al. [23] , which allows us to perform all necessary computations using BDDs and symbolic model checking [4] . For complex examples, BDD blow up can become an issue. To combat this well-known problem, we propose a variant on our approach wherein only the abstracted transitions (rather than all transitions) are strengthened with the non-interference conjectures and a (user-selected) subset of the protocol variables are omitted from the lemmas.
We've implemented an instance of approach using the forte [26] formal verification system. The tool takes a protocol described in forte's functional language reFLect, and automatically performs parameterized verification. We have successfully verified properties of three caching protocols: the original GERMAN protocol, a significantly different version GERMAN2004 [19] , [13] , and the Stanford FLASH protocol [16] .
The paper is organized as follows. Sect. 2 provides a motivating example, which contrasts the classical guard strengthening approach with our approach. Related work is discussed in Sect. 3. The general theory behind our approach is presented in Sect. 4, which again contrasts the classical approach with our own. This theory is instantiated for a class of symmetric parameterized protocols in Sect. 5. Case studies and further discussion are presented in Sects. 6 and 7, respectively. We note that proofs and some technical details have been relegated to an extended version [1] .
MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
An example parameterized system is given in Fig. 1 . The system is the interleaved composition of an arbitrary number n of identical processes.The system has two state variables: prc : N n → {s0, s1, s2, s3, s4}, where N n = {0, . . . , n − 1} are the process IDs (PID), and w, which is a Boolean. So prc(i) is the "local" state of process i, and w is a "shared" global variable. Initially, all processes are in state s0 and w is false. The transitions of an arbitrary process i are shown in Fig. 1 ; each transition is labeled with a guarded command G C, which means that the transition can occur whenever G is true and C is the resulting update. If G is omitted, then the transition is always enabled; if C is omitted, then there is no update other than process i's local state change. Note that some guards and updates mention other processes j = i. We wish to establish that the following is an invariant:
The states of the abstract systems are same as the parameterized system, except that there are only two processes 0 and 1. Hence the domain of prc is restricted to the two PIDs N 2 . We call these abstract states views and write them as a triple (w, prc(0), prc (1) ). We now outline how both the classic approach and our own approach tackles parameterized verification of this example. The Classic Approach starts by model checking an initial abstract system, created by conservatively abstracting away all processes except 0 and 1. This yields the following cex (i.e. a view sequence) (0,s0,s0), (0,s0,s1), (0,s4,s1), (1,s4,s4) The human realizes that the cex stems from the transition from the 2nd to 3rd view. This transition occurs because an abstracted process transitions from s2 to s0, with j = 0 in the update (see Fig. 1 ). By inspection, the human concludes that s2 is unreachable, and writes the lemma
Strengthening the the concrete system with ψ 1 effectively removes the transition from s2 to s0, which is justified since if s2 is unreachable, we don't need any transitions out of it. Abstracting and then model checking, we find that ψ 1 holds, but we get another cex of (1):
(0,s0,s0), (0,s1,s0), (0,s1,s1), (1,s4,s1), (0,s4,s1), (1,s4,s4) Here an abstracted process transitions from s4 to s0, which "interferes" by clearing w, allowing process 1 to get to s4. The user writes another lemma
Strengthening with ψ 1 ∧ ψ 2 allows us to label the s4-s0 transition with ψ 2 w := 0. This disallows an abstracted process from transitioning from s4 to s0 whenever a concrete process is in s4. Model checking for the third time, we find all three of (1), ψ 1 , and ψ 2 are invariants. The theory allows us to conclude that (1), as well as ψ 1 and ψ 2 , is invariant in the original parameterized system.
Our Approach employs a concretization function which takes a set of views V to a universally quantified formula γ(V ) that is used to strengthen the concrete system. Intuitively, γ(V ) characterizes the concrete states such that for all distinct PIDs i and j, the view (w, prc(i), prc(j)) is in V . We first model check the abstract system obtained by strengthening the concrete system with the "non-interference conjecture" γ(∅), which equals False. Strengthening with γ(∅) disables all transitions, and hence the set of reachable states is just the singleton of the initial view R 1 = {(0,s0,s0)}. We now take γ(R 1 ) as our new, weakened conjecture. Strengthening with γ(R 1 ), abstracting, and computing the reachable states yields R 2 = R 1 ∪{(0,s1,s0), (0,s0,s1), (0,s1,s1)}. We iterate, now using γ(R 2 ) to strengthen. The reachable views are now
(1,s3,s0), (1,s4,s0), (1,s3,s1), (1,s4,s1), (1,s0,s3), (1,s0,s4), (1,s1,s3), (1,s1,s4)
Strengthening with γ(R 3 ) yields reachable views R 4 where R 4 = R 3 . Since we've reached a fix-point, our theory tells us that γ(R 3 ) is an invariant of the concrete system. Next we simply check that γ(R 3 ) implies our property, which it does. We note that γ(R 3 ) properly implies ψ 1 ∧ ψ 2 ; this is no coincidence as our algorithm computes the strongest lemma provable in the given abstraction/concretization.
RELATED WORK
There have been many approaches to parameterized model checking and the more general paradigm of infinite state model checking, for examples well-structured transition systems [11] , [12] , regular model checking [3] , the work of Emerson and Kahlon [9] , and that of Pong and Dubois [24] . To our knowledge, none of these have been applied to a system with the complexity of the FLASH protocol. The rest of this section focuses on approaches that are closer to our own. The idea of using non-interference lemmas for parameterized model checking is attributed to McMillan [20] , [21] , who added support for this style of reasoning into Cadence SMV. The idea was later used along with Murphi by Chou et al. [6] and formalized further by Krstić [15] and Li [18] . Both papers [21] , [6] verify the FLASH coherency protocol [16] using several usersupplied lemmas and the addition of history variables. Similar types of reasoning have been applied by Chen et al. to verify hierarchical protocols [5] . Finally, a simultaneous FMCAD paper [27] simplifies the process of concocting non-interference lemmas by incorporating protocol flows. We view this work as complementary to ours, since if our aggressive automatic approach blowsup, then it is desirable to fall back onto an intuitive manual lemma framework.
Closely related work was done recently by Lv et al. [19] . Like us, they employ BDD-based methods to generate non-interference lemmas. Essentially they use the heuristic for generating candidate "invisible invariants" [23] to generate possible non-interference lemmas. Our work also draws from the invisible invariants work [23] . In particular, our BDD-based concretization computation is inspired by their techniques. Furthermore, we employ a similar small model theorem, though we use slightly tighter syntactic restrictions in order to make the small smaller. We compare against these papers [19] , [23] further in Sect. 7.
Other related work includes that of Pandav et al. [22] , who have proposed a set of heuristics to aid in constructing invariants for caching protocols. Also, environment abstraction [7] uses what amounts to existentially quantified predicate abstraction on the environment of a (concrete) process. Finally, a similar approach has been explored for software verification [14] ; however our system class is incomparable with theirs (e.g. we allow universal quantification, they allow spawning of processes, etc.).
THEORETICAL FOUNDATION
The method of guard strengthening for parameterized verification has been formalized by others [6], [15] , [18] . Our re-formalization here is motivated by three factors. First, our formalization is tailored to show how automation is achieved. Second, ours is more general than parameterized systems; it in fact applies to a finite abstraction of any finite or infinite state transition system that is a Galois connection. Finally, we believe this formalization in terms of Galois connections is more succinct than previous explanations.
Given a set S called a state space, a transition system over S is a triple T = (S, I, T ) where I ⊆ S are called the initial states and T ⊆ S × S is called the transition relation. A state s ∈ S is said to be reachable if there exists states s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s such that s 0 ∈ I, s = s, and
We will identify subsets φ of S with logic formulas that characterize them, and call such formulas state formulas.
Our goal is to verify that a state formula p is an invariant of T = (C, I, T ), which we call the concrete system. The concrete state space C consists of the typeconsistent assignments to some set of state variables. In the case of parameterized systems, these types depend on a natural parameter, but this is not relevant for the theoretical development of this section.
One can conjoin a state formula ψ with the transition relation T to strengthen it. Formally, let us define
We call T ψ the strengthening of T by ψ. Intuitively, T ψ is the same as T , except that any state c ∈ C in which ψ does not hold has no transitions. The following theorem is well-known (see e.g. Krstić [15] ) and underlies the approach of using strengthening:
Theorem 1: ψ is invariant in T if and only if ψ is invariant in T ψ.
The concrete system is verified by constructing a succession of abstract systems that over-approximate the concrete system. The abstract systems are over a finite set A called the abstract domain, which, along with a partial order , is a lattice. Each element of A is an object that represents a certain set of concrete states, and corresponds to inclusion of the represented sets. Often A will be a powerset and is ⊆. We assume a Galois connection (α, γ) between 2 C and A. This means that α : 2 C → A and γ : A → 2 C are monotonic functions such that for all φ ⊆ C and A ∈ A, we have that α(φ) A if and only if φ ⊆ γ(A). We add the additional requirement that α • γ is the identity.The functions α and γ are respectively referred to as abstraction and concretization. Intuitively, α defines the mapping that associates elements of the abstract domain with sets of concrete states. We say that a concrete state formula ψ is representable if ψ = γ(α(ψ)). The representable formulas are those that can be abstracted without loosing information.
Since the objects in A represent sets of concrete states, it is natural to approximate the concrete post image operator by a function over A called an abstract postimage. For U ⊆ C × C there is the notion of a best abstract post-image bap[U ] : A → A defined by 
Both the classic approach and our own approach employ a mechanism for performing strengthening and abstraction of the concrete transitions. We will denote this mechanism by Ω, which is not made explicit in the classic papers. We do so here since it is a key ingredient in our method, and serves to compare the two approaches. Given ψ ⊆ C, Ω first strengthens the concrete system T with ψ and then builds an abstract post-image for the strengthened system T ψ. Formally, Ω takes a representable state formula ψ and returns a function Ω(ψ) : A → A such that Ω(ψ) abstracts T ψ. We now describe how the classic approach and our approach manifest in this formal setting.
The Classic Approach. Some papers that use the classic approach compute their Ω automatically [21] , [19] while others involve the human manually selecting guarded commands to strengthen [6], [27] . Also, the user may strengthen with a formula weaker than ψ [6], [15] , [27] ; this is permissible with our Ω.
Let us say that a representable concrete state formula p is a provable invariant if there exists a representable concrete state formula ψ (i.e. the non-interference lemma) such that both Reach(α(I), Ω(ψ)) α(ψ) and Reach(α(I), Ω(ψ)) α(p). It is straightforward to show that a provable invariant deserves this title:
Theorem 2: If p is a provable invariant, then p is an invariant.
Of course the converse does not hold; the Galois connection or Ω is necessarily too weak to prove many (semantically true) invariants. Theorem 2 succinctly justifies the classical approach, although it hides the fact that the non-interference lemma ψ used to prove p is typically constructed iteratively via counter-example analysis as a conjunction i ψ i .
Our Approach makes a minor additional monotonicity requirement on Ω. We call Ω monotonic if for all representable concrete state formula ψ 1 and ψ 2 such that ψ 1 ⇒ ψ 2 , and for all A ∈ A, we have that Ω(ψ 1 )(A) Ω(ψ 2 )(A). This effectively disallows Ω from giving us a better abstract post-image from a weaker ψ.
Our algorithm can now be described. Let us assume a monotonic Ω, and define the function Reach•Ω : A → A to be the composition of Reach(α(I), ·) with Ω. I.e. for any A ∈ A we define Reach•Ω(A) = Reach(α(I), Ω(γ(A))) So Reach•Ω maps an element of the abstract domain to the best abstract approximation (afforded by Ω, α, and γ) of the reachable states of the concrete system strengthened with γ(A). We note that Reach•Ω is monotonic and acts on a finite domain, hence it has a well defined least fixed point (LFP). This LFP is computed as (Reach Automation aside, our approach is in a sense dual to the classical approach. The latter initially doesn't strengthen at all, i.e. the strengthened is done with True. Then the user repeatedly conjuncts constraints, i.e. strengthens the formula, until a lemma is found that proves the property p. On the other hand, we start with the conjecture False, and iteratively weaken it until we have a provable lemma. Since we are left with the strongest lemma (afforded by Ω, α, and γ), we know that no human intervention (respecting Ω) could help.
We can eliminate the possibility that Ω is too weak by using a best Ω relative to (α, γ). Say that Ω is best if it always yields the best abstract post image. Formally, this means that for all
If Ω is best, it follows that Lfp is the strongest noninterference lemma that is provable under Galois connection (α, γ). In our instantiation of this theory in the next section, we will first define Ω to be best. However, we have found that our BDD-based methods can potentially blow-up when using a best Ω. In this case we propose weaker variants that are not best, but are still good enough to automatically prove the desired invariant.
A simple optimization over the algorithm described here is as follows. Rather than computing the LFP of Reach • Ω, it is more efficient to compute the LFP of the sequence A 0 , A 1 , . . . defined by A 0 = α(I) and A i+1 = Reach(A i , Ω(γ(A i ))). Hence rather than starting each abstract Reach computation with the α(I), we start with the abstract object A i computed in the previous iteration. This converges on the same fix point Lfp.
PARAMETERIZED PROTOCOLS
In this section, we instantiate the general theory of Sect. 4 for a class of symmetric parameterized protocols. We restrict the state variables to be of four basic types, which are the same used by others [6], [15] , [27] , [23] . The types are Booleans, functions from PIDs to Booleans, PIDs, and functions from PIDs to PIDs; clearly multiple Booleans can be used to to encode any finite enumerated type. The PIDs are N n for some arbitrary natural n and we denote a protocol by P(n).
Our protocol class is defined by a syntax (similar to that of Krstić [15] ) that enforces symmetry and allows for certain small model theorems. The syntax is expressive enough to admit well-known cache protocol case studies, such as the three protocols we consider in Sect. 6. The class accommodates so-called conjunctive guard and broadcast communication primitives, which renders even invariant verification undecidable [10] . Thus using an incomplete verification approach such as abstraction is necessary.
The abstract domain is (a certain subset of) the powerset of a set of objects called views [6] . A view is essentially a state of P(m), where m is a small constant that the user selects, 1 except that PID-valued variables can take on a special value called oth, which represents an unknown PID in {m, m + 1, . . . , n}. The set of views, and hence its powerset, are both finite. The Galois connection we employ maps a set of protocol states to its set of constituent views, as well as all permutations of such. Similarly, concretization of a given set of views returns (a formula characterizing) the set of states having its views contained in the given set. A small model theorem asserts that there exists a small constant N , such that the views of the strengthened transition relation of P(N ) γ(V ) (where V is a set of views) capture the views of the transition relation of P(n) γ(V ) for any n ≥ N . The key corollary of the small model theorem is that we can use P(N ) γ(V ) to compute a Ω for the Galois connection. This is done using BDD-operations on the transition relation of P(N ). We note that theorem assumes that n ≥ N , hence our parameterized model checking only establishes safety of P(n) for all n ≥ N , rather than all n ≥ 0. We regard this as a negligible limitation.
We now elaborate on these ideas; first describing the concrete syntax in Sect. 5.1, then the abstract domain of 1 . typically at least the number of universally quantified PID variables in the property of interest. To reduce the flood of notation, we simply denote the Galois connection of this section by (α, γ).
Concrete System
A parameterized protocol P(n) has variables from four sets W , X, Y , and Z. We call the variables in W ∪X∪Y ∪Z the protocol variables. The variables are typed according to the middle column of Table 1 , where B is the set of the two Boolean constants. The states Σ(n) of P(n) are the set of type-consistent assignments to
For s ∈ Σ(n) and protocol variable ν, we write s[ν] for the value assigned to ν by s. For ν ∈ X ∪ Z, we write s[ν(i)] for the ith entry in the array s[ν].
The transition relation τ of P(n), and strengthenings thereof, are expressed as formulas we call protocol transition formula. A rigorous definition of protocol formula is given in [1] ; here we give an intuitive description. The important point is that the syntax provides a balance between the two conflicting requirements of expressiveness and having a small enough small model theorem, which will be stated in Sect. 5.4. A protocol transition formula is a restricted first order formula over atomic propositions called atoms. These atoms perform various queries on the protocol variables, such as indexing into an array, comparison between PID variables, and evaluating a Boolean. Atoms also allow for priming of protocol variables to refer to the next state. We employ three sets of PID variables (disjoint from Y ) to quantify over: E = {e 0 , . . . , e −1 }, U = {u 0 , . . . , u k−1 }, and Q = {q 0 , . . . , q m−1 }. We will write e for the tuple e 0 , . . . , e −1 and similarly for u and q. Protocol transition formulas are of the form
Where φ 0 and φ 1 are quantifier-free Boolean combinations of atoms (see [1] for details) . Here φ 0 characterizes the unstrengthened transition relation; the existential quantification allows for "Murphi"-like rulesets [8] constructs over PIDs. Hence = |E| is the maximum level of nesting of PID rulesets. The second conjunct ∀ q.φ 1 is a strengthening formula. We will see in Sect. 5.3 that our concretization function produces formula of this form; we note that m here is the number of "concrete processes" used in views. The initial states of P(n) will also be required to be protocol transition formula, except with no primed variables.
Abstract Domain: Symmetric Sets of Views
A view is an assignment to the protocol variables, but with typing according to the rightmost column in Table 1 . Here N oth m = {0, . . . , m − 1} ∪ {oth}, where oth is a fresh symbol that will represent an arbitrary element of N n \ N m . Our abstract domain is simply the set of symmetric sets of views, along with the inclusion ordering ⊆. This notion of symmetric is best defined using the Galois connection, which is the focus of the next subsection. Hence we postpone the definition momentarily.
Galois Connection
Let τ be a protocol transition formula (3) and let s 0 , s 1 ∈ Σ(n). We write (s 0 , s 1 ) τ to indicate that τ is satisfied when unprimed and primed protocol variables are valuated by s 0 and s 1 , respectively. Call an injection π : N m → N n a view map. For any i ∈ N n and view map π, defineπ(i) to be π We now introduce the abstraction function α that takes subsets of Σ(n) to sets of views and a corresponding concretization function γ. For ϕ ⊆ Σ(n), define α(ϕ) = {View π (s) | s ∈ ϕ and π is a view map} Thus α(ϕ) is the set of all views that are the π-views of some state in ϕ for some π. Computing α using BDDs is straightforward, especially when ϕ is symmetrical. In this case, α(ϕ) can be computed by View id (ϕ), where id is the identity function on N m . In our algorithm, α is only directly applied to such sets, i.e. the initial states and the property being checked.
Concretization is expressed by
Here distinct( q) means that q i = q j for all 0 ≤ i < j < m. For a view v, the formula Π(v) is a quantifier-free Boolean combination of atoms that precisely characterizes the concrete states having π-view being v, where π takes i ∈ N m to (the valuation of) q i . Thus γ(V ) says that for any m distinct PIDs {q 0 , . . . , q m−1 } one selects, the corresponding view must be an element of V . Defining Π(v) is straightforward but tedious, hence we relegate it to the extended paper [1] . We note that (4) is given for exposition purposes only and is never used directly during computation. In Sect. 5.2 we mentioned that our abstract domain is a subset of the powerset of views, i.e. those that are symmetric. We are now equipped to define this notion. A set of views V is said to be symmetric if α(γ(V )) = V .
Theorem 4: (α, γ) is a Galois connection between 2
and symmetric sets of views. We conclude this section by noting that our (α, γ) is quite similar to the Galois connection used for universally quantified predicate abstraction [17] .
Computing Ω with BDDs
This section explains how we compute the best abstract post-image bap[τ ] for a protocol transition formula τ . In turn, this allows us to compute the best Ω. In summary, our protocol transition formula admit a small model theorem. Recall that is the number of existentially quantified variables in τ (3) , and m is the number of "concrete" processes in the views. Let us write τ N for the set of all
Theorem 5 (Small Model Theorem): Let τ be a protocol transition formula and let N = m + + 1.
Theorem 5 allows us to compute a BDD representation of bap[τ ] as follows. First, we build a BDD for the transition relation τ N . Next we massage this BDD into a BDD for T by applying View id to both the present and next state variables; this involves two steps. First, all X-type and Z-type variables (both primed and unprimed) with indices in {m, . . . , N − 1} are existentially abstracted out of τ N . Second, oth is represented by any value ≥ m, thus we canonicallize so that whenever a PID variable is ≥ m, we allow it to be any such value; this is accomplished through straightforward BDD operations. The result represents the T in the statement of Theorem 5. Finally, post[T ] is computed with standard BDD techniques [4] .
Applying our approach of Sect. 4 requires us to map an arbitrary symmetric set of views V to a best abstract post-image Ω(γ(V )). This post-image must abstract the formula
Note that τ is a valid protocol transition formula (3) since γ(V ) is of the form ∀ q.φ 1 . Let γ N (V ) be the BDD for the elements of Σ(N ) that satisfy γ(V ). Once we have γ N (V ), computing τ N is straightforward, and thus so too is bap[τ ] via Theorem 5.
The BDD γ N (V ) is computed as follows. Recall that γ(V ) is defined by (4) . Since γ N (V ) restricts us to PIDs in N N , we can replace the universal quantifier and the antecedent distinct( q) with a conjunction like so:
where p ranges over all m-tuples of distinct elements of N N . For each such m-tuple p, we compute the BDD for
, using a technique due to Pnueli et al. [23] . Here Θ( p) is defined
In effect, Θ( p) constrains the π-view of the primed state to some view in the unprimed state, where π(i) = p i for each i ∈ N m . By taking the post-image of Θ( p) with respect to the view set V , we get the set of all s ∈ Σ(N ) such that View π (s) ∈ V . Finally, by conjuncting over all p as in (5), we obtain γ N (V ). We conclude this section by noting that when BDD blow-up becomes an issue, a remedy is to soundly weaken Ω, which can be done in two orthogonal ways. First, one can remove various conjuncts from (6). This amounts to identifying that certain variables are not needed in the non-interference lemma. Second, when the protocol transition formula is a disjunction of guarded commands (GC), one can apply different subsets of the conjuncts in (5) to each command. This allows one to leave unabstracted GCs unstrengthened, while applying strengthening to abstracted GCs. This can be done purely algorithmically. Previous approaches [19] , [15] , [6] , [27] allow the human to use such heuristics on a lemmaby-lemma basis; in contrast we write a simple weakening scheme once and our algorithm then proceeds to compute the strongest lemma provable under the weaker Ω. Weakening Ω tends to decrease the number of iterations of the outer loop while increasing the number of iterations of the inner loop of our algorithm.
CASE STUDIES
We applied our technique to three coherency protocols: GERMAN, GERMAN2004, and FLASH. The GERMAN protocol was originally poised as a challenge problem for parameterized model checking by German [13] , it is rather simple and has been verified many times in the literature [19] , [6], [2] , [23] , [22] . GERMAN2004 is a significant modification of GERMAN and is considerably more complex; it was first formally verified by Lv et al. [19] , though they required some manually added history variables. Finally, FLASH [16] is quite well-known. The control property for FLASH was first automatically verified by Lv et al. [19] . As pointed out by Chou et al. [6] : "FLASH is a good test for any proposed method of parameterized verification; if the method works on FLASH, then there is a good chance that it will also work on many real-world cache coherence protocols. " We implemented our approach using the forte formal verification system [26] . We hand translated the protocols from their Murphi descriptions into reFLect, forte's functional language. They were written as protocol transition formula, which required some minor refactoring in some cases 2 . A tarball including our implementation and the case study models is available [1] .
We successfully verified the control and data properties for GERMAN, and the control properties for GER-MAN2004 and FLASH. For GERMAN, we used a best Ω and BDD-blow-up was a non-issue For the other two protocols, the ability to weaken Ω was very useful to curb BDD blow-up issues, as was dynamic variable reordering [25] . Weakening Ω involves identifying some variables to omit from (6); finding a good set was simply a matter of trial and error and does not involve any insights about the protocol. 3 We note that for these experiments we used a slightly different small model theorem than Theorem 5 that effectively reduces N by 1 to m + , at the expense that post[T ] is not quite best. This alternate small model theorem is stated and proved in the extended version [1] .
Our results are given in Table 2 . All runs were done on a 64-bit linux machine. The columns "time" and "mem" give the runtime in minutes and the memory usage in GB, respectively. The "outer" column gives the number of iterations of the outer loop of our algorithm, i.e. the number of iterations to find the fix-point of Reach • Ω. The "inner" column gives the number of abstract postimage iterations to compute Reach, for each iteration of the outer loop. Since the best Ω was used for GERMAN, the inner loop always iterates just twice. Fig. 2 gives a very simple parameterized protocol for which our approach of Sect. 5 fails, in the sense that the property holds but our algorithm is unable to prove it. Fig. 2 uses the same notation as Sect. 2. Initially, all processes are in s0, and we wish to prove the (clearly true) invariant ∀i.prc(i) = s2. Our algorithm fails at this verification; this stems from the fact the existentially quantified lemma ∀i.∃j = i.prc(i) = s1 ⇒ prc(j) = s1 is needed. Our automatically generated lemmas are restricted to be of the form (4), which only allows for universal quantification. We note that adding history variables can help in this situation; if done correctly our algorithm can easily verify this example.
DISCUSSION

Example of Insufficiency
Comparison with Invisible Invariants
The most salient difference between our approach and that of invisible invariants [23] and Lv et al. [19] is that the lemma we generate is guaranteed to be an invariant, while the other methods heuristically produce a possible invariant. This possible invariant is constructed by generalizing the reachable states of a small instance of the concrete system. This leads to the question: are there systems for which invisible invariants fail, while our approach succeeds?
The answer is positive. Consider a parameterized system where each process has a single bit, initially all False. There is a global 15-bit counter initially 0. Any process that has its bit clear can set it, and increment the counter (unless it is saturated). We want to prove that if any two processes have their bits set, then the counter is at least 2. The invisible invariants method would compute the reachable states of the concrete system with 2 processes. Generalizing this space does not yield an invariant, However, our algorithm produces an invariant that is strong enough to prove the property. Of course, if a large enough concrete system is used to generate the candidate invisible invariant, their approach will succeed. However, this would require model checking the instance of size 2 15 , which has over 2 15 state variables. It is interesting to note that one can extend the invisible invariant method by feeding back non-inductive formula (i.e. failed invariant candidates) as initial conditions, and then iterating the method until an inductive invariant is found. 4 The resulting "fix-point" invisible invariant method would be very similar to our approach, with the exception that the invisible invariant small model theorem is not as small as our own.
